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ABSTRACT
The 9/11 terrorist attacks brought on financial losses that
caused insurers and Congress to reevaluate how the United States
approaches terrorism risk coverage. Congress quelled concerns
of insurers evading coverage of future terrorist attacks by
enacting the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act in 2002. This Note
considers the difficulties presented by the out-of-date language
employed by Congress in 2002 and proposes amendments so that
the Act more clearly covers acts of cyberterrorism, which are
ever-growing in their destructive potential.

INTRODUCTION
The tragic events of September 11, 2001 caused panic throughout
industries in the United States. The insurance industry experienced direct
financial pain. Due to the high insurance payouts1 from claims based on
the September 11 attacks, insurers reevaluated their position, ultimately
deciding the extremely high expected payouts and low predictability made
terrorism risk insurance almost impossible to cover comfortably.
Congress responded by enacting the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002
(“TRIA”),2 which created a federal program designed to facilitate
reinsurance for terrorism risk. Thereafter, insurers were required to
participate in the program and insure terrorism risk. The newly created
program has yet to be activated, as the U.S. has not been subject to another
catastrophic terrorist attack the level of the September 11 attacks.
New terrorist groups have emerged that are focused on
cyberwarfare and cyberterrorism. Even though cyberattacks are more
common now, Congressional reauthorization in 2007, 2015, and 2019 left
TRIA’s language unchanged. This paper argues that TRIA’s language
leaves ambiguity as to when the Secretary of the Treasury (“Secretary”)
must certify a cyberattack as an act of terrorism. This ambiguity creates
dangerous regulatory uncertainty for both insurers and the insured, as the
Secretary’s certification determines an insurer’s decision to cover the
event.
†
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TRIA was reauthorized in December 2019.3
In such
reauthorization, Congress extended the program until 2027, requesting
Treasury research the effectiveness of the program in regards to
cyberterrorism.4 Congress should have gone one step further by explicitly
including cyberattacks as an act of terrorism.

I. BACKGROUND: TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE
A. Pre-September 11 Attacks
Before September 11, 2001, terrorism risk insurance coverage was
widely available. Since the 1930s, personal and commercial property
insurance increasingly covered all risks of property loss, called all-peril
coverage.5 Under all-peril coverage, insurers would compensate property
losses regardless of the cause.6 The all-peril coverage eventually turned
into general package policies, which came with certain exceptions, such
as acts of war.7 By 1995, 93% of all homeowners’ policies were all-peril
with explicitly stated limited exceptions.8 Acts of war were often an
exception to coverage because acts of war are inherently catastrophic and
can drain all the capital from insurers in a single event.9 Although acts of
terrorism seem to parallel acts of war by causing similarly high losses, acts
of terrorism were not among the exceptions in property insurance
coverage.10
The inconsistency in insurance coverage treatment can be
attributed to general ignorance, due to extremely low probability and
difficulty in defining “acts of terrorism.”11 Before 9/11, insurers simply
did not consider terrorism attacks a credible threat, despite the 1993 World
Trade Center bombing and the 1995 Oklahoma City bombings.12 Notably,
many other countries’ insurance policies explicitly excluded terrorism risk
due to increased terrorist activities in the 1970s and 1980s.13 Although
many foreign insurers noted and addressed terrorism risk, insurers in the
United States neglected any concern for terrorism risk.

3

Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2019, H.R. 1865,
116th Cong. § 501 (2019).
4
H.R. 1865, § 502. The research conducted by Treasury, published in April 2020,
indicated ambiguity and confusion as will be explained in this Note. See UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE:
MARKET IS STABLE BUT TREASURY COULD STRENGTHEN COMMUNICATIONS
ABOUT ITS PROCESS (2020).
5
Howard Kunreuther & Mark Pauly, Terrorism Losses and All Perils Insurance,
23 J. INS. REG. 3, 5 (2005).
6
Id.
7
Id.
8
See id. (noting commercial property coverage likely was almost exclusively allperil, as commercial property coverage mirrored personal property coverage).
9
Id. at 6.
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Id. at 5.
11
Id. at 9, 11.
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Id. at 7, 11.
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Id. at 10, 11.
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Additionally, acts of terrorism took many forms and came from
many sources. The United States had yet to recognize a legal definition of
an “act of terrorism.”14 Further, typical act of war exclusions disclaimed
coverage over “large losses from war and correlated warlike activities.”15
Insurers may have assumed all attacks against the United States that
caused extremely large monetary losses would fall under the act of war
exclusion. However, in the only pre-2001 case challenging the denial of
an insurance claim based on an act of war exclusion, the Second Circuit
denied an insurer the right to claim an act of war exclusion on a plane
destroyed by terrorists.16 By September 11, 2001, terrorism risk was
insured as an afterthought to general property insurance coverage.17

B. Introduction to Terrorism Risk Insurance Act & Terrorism Risk
Insurance Program
On September 11, 2001, terrorists caused about 3,000 deaths18 and
about $22 billion in property damage.19 In total, an estimated $35 billion
to $75 billion in monetary losses were suffered.20 As a result, insurance
providers were expected to make heavy payouts on claims against the
attacks.21 Reinsurers were expected to compensate primary insurers for
the payouts.22 Insurers and reinsurers had no choice. Not only would the
American public and leaders have ostracized insurers who considered
rejecting claims on the September 11 attacks,23 but the only court case
related to the issue was resolved in favor of the insured.24
Although a terrorist attack against the United States was not
surprising, the American people and insurers were stunned by this attack’s
devasting losses.25 The monetary losses suffered were the highest of any
14

Id. at 11.
Richard Allyn & Heather McNeff, The Fall and Rise of Terrorism Insurance
Coverage Since September 11, 2001, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 821, 823 (2003)
(emphasis added).
16
See Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co, 505
F.2d 989, 1009–22 (2d Cir. 1974) (holding the doctrine of contra proferentem
applies in this case because many terms in the exclusions were not judicially
defined).
17
See id.
18
Allyn & McNeff, supra note 15, at 826.
19
Adam Z. Rose & S. Brock Blomberg, Total Economic Consequences of
Terrorist Attacks: Insights from 9/11, 16 PEACE ECONOMICS, PEACE SCIENCE AND
PUBLIC POLICY 1, 6 (2010).
20
See Allyn & McNeff, supra note 15, at 826. See also, Kunreuther & Pauly,
supra 5, at 4 (estimating insurance losses at $40 billion).
21
See Allyn & McNeff, supra note 15, at 827 (citing the U.S. House Financial
Services Committee letter stating that “it would be unpatriotic of insurers to try to
avoid coverage of the attack based on ‘legal maneuvering’”).
22
Kunreuther & Pauly, supra note 5, at 11.
23
See Allyn & McNeff, supra note 15, at 827 (noting that Congress wrote a letter
directed at insurers, which stated “that it would be unpatriotic of insurers to try
to avoid coverage of the attack based on ‘legal maneuvering’”).
24
Pan American World Airways, 505 F.2d 989, 1009–22 (2d Cir. 1974).
25
See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
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disaster in United States history.26 The Congressional Research Service
estimated the 9/11 attacks were the largest insurance loss from a terrorist
attack, totaling $26.22 billion in property insurance losses.27 For reference,
the next twenty largest attacks totaled $6.55 billion in property insurance
losses.28 Insurers responded to the September 11 attacks by adding
terrorism exclusions to new and renewed property and casualty
insurance.29 This new policy effectively protected insurers from paying
certain claims against future terrorist attacks.30 The National Association
of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”) and most states approved the new
terrorism risk exclusion.31 By February 2002, 45 states, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico, had approved the exclusion.32 Under these
state-approved exclusions, if terrorists attacked the United States, ordinary
citizens would have to pay for the damage sustained.33
Fearing the lack of terrorism risk coverage would be a significant
factor in business decisions, particularly lending,34 Congress enacted the
Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, signed into law by President Bush on
November 26, 2002.35 TRIA created the Terrorism Risk Insurance
Program (“TRIP”), a federal loss-sharing program for terrorism risk
insurance coverage.36 TRIP requires insurers make terrorism risk
coverage available for all property and casualty insurance policies for all
consumers.37 For example, if a homeowner has a car, insurers must offer
terrorism risk insurance for both the homeowner’s auto and home
insurance policies. This coverage requirement applies to all property and
casualty policies.
Insurers offer terrorism risk insurance at an average of 2.5 to 3.0
percent of the total premium.38 Often, terrorism risk insurance is included
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS 174–214 (2004) (detailing the multiple
attacks planned or conducted against the United States by Islamic extremists and
growing animosity against the United States in the decade leading up to the
September 11th attacks).
26
See Robert H. Jerry, II, Insurance, Terrorism, and 9/11: Reflections on Three
Threshold Questions, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 95, 105 (2002) (noting that before the
September 11th attacks, Hurricane Andrew was the largest insured disaster in
United States history, which caused $16 billion in losses and was, to some degree,
predicted).
27
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT
(TRIA) 1 (last updated Feb. 1, 2019).
28
Id.
29
Allyn & McNeff, supra note 15, at 828.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 830.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 27.
35
Allyn & McNeff, supra note 15, at 828.
36
Background on: Terrorism risk and insurance, INSURANCE INFORMATION
INSTITUTE (Dec. 16, 2019), https://www.iii.org/article/background-on-terrorismrisk-and-insurance.
37
Id.
38
Federal Insurance Office, Report on the Effectiveness of the Terrorism Risk
Insurance Program, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, 25 (June 2018).
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in policies for no extra cost.39 As of 2017, about 70–80% of consumers
have purchased terrorism risk insurance.40 Under TRIP, insurers must pay
the claims on certified acts of terrorism for those consumers while the
federal government provides a federal backstop that allows insurers to
reclaim the payments through higher future premiums across the board.41
Since 2001, many terrorist attacks have occurred;42 however, none of the
terror attacks have been certified as an act of terrorism for TRIP purposes.

C. Cyberspace
1. Cyberattacks in the United States
Cyberattacks have been around since the 1980s.43 As the internet
use skyrocketed in the 1990s and turn of the century, cyberattacks became
sophisticated, enabling attackers to steal valuable data44 and destroy
computer infrastructure.45
Hacking has resulted in hundreds of millions of financial losses.
In 2007, hackers from the United States, Eastern Europe, and China stole
45,700,000 credit and debit card numbers, eventually resulting in a $130
million settlement.46 The hack has reportedly affected an additional 48
million people.47 In 2008, hackers stole customer data from Internet
Auction, one of Korea’s largest Internet shopping sites.48 About 10.8
million customers were affected by the Internet Auction attack. Hackers
stole information from 3 billion Yahoo! accounts in 2013 and another 500
million separately in 2014.49 These continued hacks “will cost the world
$6 trillion annually by 2021,” according to Cybersecurity Ventures.50
39

Id.
Id. at 29.
41
See id.
42
Peter Bergen, Albert Ford, et al., Terrorism in America After 9/11, NEW
AMERICA (Sep. 18, 2019), https://www.newamerica.org/in-depth/terrorism-inamerica/part-i-overview-terrorism-cases-2001-today/.
43
Michael Preciado, If You Wish Cyber Peace, Prepare for Cyber War: The Need
for the Federal Government to Protect Critical Infrastructure from Cyber
Warfare, 1 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 99, 104 (2012).
44
See, e.g., id. at 111–12 (describing the cases of Kevin Poulsen and Kevin
Mitnick).
45
See, e.g., Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating
Cyberattack in History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com
/story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/.
46
Tiffany Gates & Katy Jacob, Payments Fraud: Perception Versus Reality – A
Conference Summary, 32 ECON. PERSPECTIVES 1, 7 (2009).
47
Id.
48
MinJae Lee & JinKyu Lee, The impact of information security failure on
customer behaviors: A study on a large-scale hacking incident on the internet, 14
Inf. Syst. Front. 375, 375 (2012).
49
Soo Youn, The Capital One data breach is alarming, but these are the 5 worst
corporate hacks, ABC NEWS (Jul 30, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/
Technology/marriotts-data-breach-large-largest-worst-corporatehacks/story?id=59520391.
50
Steve Morgan, Cybercrime Damages $6 Trillion By 2021, CYBERSECURITY
VENTURES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://cybersecurityventures.com/hackerpocalypsecybercrime-report-2016/.
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Some hacking is becoming politically motivated. “Hacktivism” is the
recent movement, described by the Department of Justice’s National
Infrastructure Protection Center, where hacker activists “launch politically
motivated attacks on public web pages or e-mail servers.”51
Hacking to steal information is only one highly destructive form
of cyberattack. Recently considered to be “the Most Devastating
Cyberattack in History,” NotPetya was released by alleged Russian
military hackers known as Sandworm in 2017.52 NotPetya was a piece of
malware released into a single company’s update servers.53 Once released,
the malware “spread automatically, rapidly, and indiscriminately.”54
Within hours, NotPetya spread from its origin site in Ukraine to computers
around the world – from hospitals in the United States to factories in
Tasmania – even hitting the Russian state-sponsored oil company,
Rosneft.55 Once in a computer, NotPetya encrypted the master boot
records, immediately destroyed the computer’s ability to find its own
operating system.56 If a computer cannot find and load its own operating
system, it is crippled beyond repair.57 To jump from computer to computer
within a single system, the worm stole the username and password of
employees whose credentials could be used to log into multiple
computers.58 Therefore, once in a company’s system, NotPetya crippled
most company computers, effectively crippling the company’s ability to
function.59 Maersk, Merck, TNT Express, Saint-Gobaian, Mondelez, and
Rickitt Benckiser were all crippled, each required to pay nine-figures to
replace the destroyed machines.60 In total, the White House estimated
more than $10 billion in damage resulted worldwide.61 Only one month
prior to the release of NotPetya, another kind of malware, WannaCry,
caused between $4 billion and $8 billion in damage.62
2. Cyberterrorism
Cyberspace is an attractive mode of attack for terrorists for several
reasons. Terrorists with fewer resources can “target and affect large

51

Eric J. Sinrod & William P. Reilly, Cyber-Crimes: A Practical Approach to the
Application of Federal Computer Crime Laws, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 177, 183 (2000).
52
Andy Greenberg, The Untold Story of NotPetya, the Most Devastating
Cyberattack in History, WIRED (Aug. 22, 2018), https://www.wired.com/
story/notpetya-cyberattack-ukraine-russia-code-crashed-the-world/.
53
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54
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Id.
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Id. See also Jonathan Berr, “WannaCry” ransomware attack losses could reach
$4 billion, CBS NEWS (May 16, 2017), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/
wannacry-ransomware-attacks-wannacry-virus-losses/.
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numbers of people” with just a computer and internet access.63
Cyberterrorists can more easily blend into the common population of host
states.64 Specific targeting of weaker, exploitable systems is easier.65
Once the malware is developed and placed, launching an attack can be
instantaneous and sometimes requires no further preparation.66
Navigating through cyberspace is, in some circumstances, easier to
navigate without detection than navigating through physical space.67
Despite the appeal, cyberterrorism has only recently become a
significant fear with the introduction of the WannaCry and NotPetya
attacks.68 “Traditionally, most cyberattacks have been carried out by
criminal organizations,” not by terror organizations.69 WannaCry and
NotPetya, which “affected organizations in more than 150 countries”
combined, are likely to spur more cyberterrorism activity.70
Critical infrastructure is especially sensitive to a terrorist attack.
In 2013, then-President Barack Obama issued an executive order
addressing critical infrastructure cybersecurity, noting the “cyber threat to
critical infrastructure continues to grow and represents one of the most
serious national security challenges we must confront.”71 Terrorists tend
to look to amass the most destruction in a single attack. Malware like
WannaCry and NotPetya has the potential to infiltrate and destroy U.S.
infrastructure, such as hospital systems or electrical grids, leaving millions
vulnerable instantaneously. Although the United States is noting and
addressing cybersecurity concerns of critical infrastructure,72
cyberwarfare is a continually adaptive endeavor.73

II. TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE PROGRAM
A. Certification of an Act of Terrorism
For TRIP to be initiated, the Secretary of the Treasury, in
concurrence with the Secretary of State and the Attorney General of the

63

Murat Dogrul, Adil Aslan & Eyyup Celik, Developing an International
Cooperation on Cyber Defense and Deterrence against Cyber Terrorism,
TURKISH AIR WAR COLLEGE 29, 32 (2011).
64
See id. at 33 (“[Being in a host state] enables terrorists to remain unknown”).
65
See id. (“…attacks are easy to carry out because many targets are poorly
protected”).
66
Id.
67
See id. (“There are no physical barriers or check points that [terrorists] have to
cross.”).
68
Emil Metropoulos & Jeremy S. Platt, Global Cyber Terrorism Incidents on the
Rise,
MARSH
&
MCLENNAN
ADVANTAGE,
(Nov.
2018),
https://www.mmc.com/insights/publications/2018/nov/global-cyber-terrorismincidents-on-the-rise.html.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Exec. Order. No. 13636, 78 FR 11739, 11739 (Feb. 12, 2013).
72
See generally, id.
73
See Michael Plachta, Council of Europe Adopts Resolution and
Recommendation on Cyberterrorism, 31 NO. 7 INT’L ENF’T L. REP. 279 (Jul.
2015).
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United States, must certify an attack as an “act of terrorism.”74 The
Secretary’s decision to certify or refrain from certifying an attack is final
and “not… subject to judicial review.”75 Certification falls only on the
Secretary of the Treasury’s shoulders, and may not be delegated “to any
other officer, employee, or person . . .”76 Therefore, only the Secretary of
the Treasury can initiate the program, and that initiation is based on a
certification that cannot be contested by any party.
TRIA details a four-pronged definition for certification of an ‘act
of terrorism.’77 First, the attack must “be an act of terrorism.”78 Second,
the attack must be a “violent act or an act that is dangerous to… human
life;… property; or… infrastructure.”79 Third, the attack must result in
damage within the United States, on an air carrier or vessel, or the premises
of a United States mission.80 Finally, the attackers must have acted “on
behalf of any foreign person or foreign interest, as part of an effort to
coerce the civilian population of the United States or to influence the
policy or affect the conduct of the United States Government by
coercion.”81
If the Secretary of the Treasury certifies an attack as an act of
terrorism, the program is subject to a triggering threshold based on total
insurance losses from the attack.82 Originally set at $5 million in 2002,
subsequent reauthorizations of TRIA in 2007 and 2015 raised the
threshold to $100 million and $200 million, respectively.83 If an attack
has caused more than $200 million in damages and was certified as an act
of terrorism for TRIP purposes, insurers must cover claims due to the
attack. The program remains in effect up to $100 billion in losses per
year.84 If certified acts of terrorism have caused more than $100 billion in
covered losses in a year, the losses above the $100 billion threshold may
not be covered by insurers.

74

Fed. Ins. Office, supra note 38, at 29.
Terrorism Risk Ins. Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, § 102(1)(C).
76
Id. at § 102(1)(D).
77
Id. at § 102(1)(A). In addition to the four-pronged definition, the Act provides
an exception to certification if “the act is committed as part of the course of a war
declared by Congress.” § 102(1)(B). However, Congress last declared a war in
1942, despite the United States engaging in warfare since 1942. United States
Senate,
Official
Declarations
of
War
by
Congress
(2010)
https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/h_multi_sections_and_teasers/
WarDeclarationsbyCongress.html.
78
Id. at § 102(1)(A)(i).
79
Id. at § 102(1)(A)(ii).
80
Id. at § 102(1)(A)(iii).
81
Id. at § 102(1)(A)(iv).
82
Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 36.
83
See § 102(1)(B)(ii) (disallowing certification of attacks wherein “property and
casualty insurance losses resulting from the act, in the aggregate, do not exceed
$5,000,000”). See also, Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act
of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-160, 121 Stat. 1839; Terrorism Risk Insurance Program
Reauthorization Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-1, 129 Stat. 3.
84
See Ins. Info. Inst., supra note 36.
75
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The definition of an act of terrorism under TRIA has not been
interpreted by courts for two reasons. First, although there have been
many terror attacks since 2001, none have risen to the financial threshold
required to be certified.85 Therefore, there has been no reason to interpret
the statute. However, even if TRIP were to be initiated, TRIA specifically
denies the courts the ability to adjudicate the Secretary’s certification.86
Therefore, the somewhat abstract process of certification
concerned Congress in light of questions of certifying the Boston
Marathon bombing.87 For clarity purposes, Congress required the
Secretary of the Treasury to “conduct and complete a study on the process
by which the Secretary determines whether to certify an ‘act of terrorism’
under TRIA…”88 The Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) fulfilled
that request by issuing a report in October 2015 on TRIP Certification.89
The report focused on the procedure of efficiently certifying, rather than
the substance of certification.90
The Treasury explained three “general criteria” required for
certification, which traced the second, third, and fourth prongs of the
definition of an “act of war” under TRIA.91 Under Treasury’s general
criteria, first, the act must “be a violent act or an act that is dangerous to
human life, property, or infrastructure…”92 Second, the attack must “have
resulted in damage within the United States.”93 Finally, the act must “have
been committed by an individual or individuals, as part of an effort to
coerce the civilian population of the United States or influence the policy
or affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion.”94
Treasury noted the first and third criteria posit “a number of potential
permutations” and add to the “complexity of the certification analysis.”95

85

In April 2013, the Boston Marathon bombing, which President Barack Obama
called an “act of terror,” resulted in less than $5 million in damages, according to
the Massachusetts Department of Insurance. Baird Webel, Terrorism Risk
Insurance: Issue Analysis and Overview of Current Program, Congressional
Research Service, 2 (July 23, 2014). The Boston Marathon bombing was “one of
the highest-profile attacks on U.S. soil since Sept. 11, 2001,” killing three people
and wounding 260 others. Nate Raymond, Boston Marathon bomber appeals
conviction,
death
sentence,
REUTERS
(Dec.
27,
2018),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-boston-bombings-appeal/boston-marathonbomber-appeals-conviction-death-sentence-idUSKCN1OQ1F4.
86
See Terrorism Risk Ins. Act of 2002 § 102(1)(C).
87
See Terrorism Risk Ins. Program Reauthorization Act of 2015 § 107.
88
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, THE PROCESS FOR CERTIFYING AN “ACT
OF TERRORISM” UNDER THE TERRORISM RISK INSURANCE ACT OF 2002, (Oct.
2015).
89
See generally, id.
90
See generally, id.
91
Id. at 5. The general criteria excluded the first prong that the attack be an act of
terrorism, as Treasury found this prong to be circular and therefore did not add
anything to the analysis.
92
Id.
93
Id.
94
Id.
95
Id.
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B. Applying TRIA to Cyberattacks
The undisputable discretion given to the Secretary of the Treasury
presents legal issues. First, without legal precedent or guidance on
certification, the Secretary’s decision to certify an attack can fall on
arbitrary judgments. Second, as the Secretary’s decision is final,
certification of an act of terrorism is fully removed from the President’s
Article II powers. The only guidance published by Treasury on
certification of an act of terrorism reiterated the definition of an “act of
terrorism” without laying out a method of analyzing the definition.”96 The
public and insurers are left guessing how the Secretary of the Treasury will
interpret TRIA’s definition of an “act of terrorism” without useful
guidance from Treasury or Congress.
1. The Search for a Violent or Dangerous Act in
Cyberspace
The Secretary would first have to determine whether the attack is
a violent act or at least one dangerous to human life, property, or
infrastructure. For an act to be violent, it must be “marked by the use of
usually harmful or destructive physical force.”97 Cyberattacks are not
typically thought of as physical, but there are physical aspects of a
cyberattack. The attackers are moving through cyberspace – a nonphysical medium – and may be attacking a non-physical system, such as a
hospital electronic medical record system or an electrical grid. However,
some bugs may be created that can overheat computers, crashing
computers through use of some harmful physical force.98 Whether an
attack is dangerous to human life, property, or infrastructure is highly
factual. Unlike a physical attack, where material weapons are used to
destroy property cyberattacks may take many forms and produce many
outcomes, some of which are far from physical.
Stealing data may be dangerous to human life, but only if the data
is highly sensitive. For example, if a piece of data suggests the location of
a United States spy abroad, a hacker who illegally obtains that piece of
data by means of a cyberattack may fall under the first of the three general
criteria. However, this one piece of data may be hidden in a mountain of
stolen data. The hacker may not even know what data was obtained. The
Secretary may similarly be unaware. For the Secretary to make a
determination of dangerousness to human life, the Secretary must not only
know exactly what data was stolen, but also what inferences may be made
based on the data, and how those inferences may be used to threaten U.S.
lives.
Data may also be seen as a form of property. If so, stealing data
owned by a U.S. person or business is inherently dangerous to property.
However, it is unclear whether TRIA was intended to protect this type of
96

See generally, id.
Violent, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (11th Ed. 2019).
98
Hamilton Turner, et al., Bad Parts: Are Our Manufacturing Systems at Risk of
Silent Cyberattacks?, 41, IEEE Computer and Reliability Societies (May/June
2015), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?arnumber=7118094.
97
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property. Congress neglected to define “property” under TRIA.99 And
“basing the definition of ‘property’ on a judgment call…allows the
government’s interests to warp the private rights” of U.S. citizens.100
TRIA gives Secretary of the Treasury unopposed unilateral discretion in
determining how to define property. When considering the definition of
‘property’ under the Bankruptcy Act, the Supreme Court has noted “the
most important consideration limiting the breadth of the definition of
‘property’ lies in the basic purpose of the Bankruptcy Act…”101 The Court
looked to the Act’s framers’ intent to determine purpose.102
The framers of TRIA did not explicate an interest in a certain type
of property. However, the framers enacted TRIA a year after the
September 11 attacks. TRIA was effectively a Congressional response to
state-approved terrorism risk exclusions after the September 11 attacks.103
The stated purpose of the Act did not point to a certain type of property,
but rather focused on providing property and casualty insurance.104 So the
framers’ definition of “property” may be derived from what is covered
under property and casualty insurance. Cyber liability falls under property
and casualty insurance.105 However, typically cyber insurance policies
contain exclusions, including intellectual property,106 data breaches,107
and common physical causes of computer crashes.108 For example, the
standard commercial property policy excludes perils caused by power
surges, electrical disturbances, temperature changes, and mechanical

99

See generally, Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116
Stat. 2322.
100
Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S.Ct. 1933, 1957 (2017) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
101
Lines v. Frederick, 400 U.S. 18, 19 (1970) (citing Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292
U.S. 234, 244 (1934)).
102
Id. (citing Swarts v. Fourth Nat‘l Bank, 117 F. 1, 3 (8th Cir. 1902)).
103
See Allyn & McNeff, supra note 15, at 828.
104
See Terrorism Risk Insurance Act at § 101(b) (stating the purpose of the Act
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breakdown.109 The standard policy’s exclusions are all typical methods
malware, like NotPeyta and WannaCry, destroy computers.
As TRIA requires insurers to provide terrorism risk insurance for
all covered property and casualty insurance, these exclusions are
problematic for certifying a cyberattack on the basis that the attack is
dangerous to property for two reasons. First, if the Secretary of the
Treasury defines property by the purpose of the Act, property does not
include stolen intellectual property, stolen data, or destroyed computers.
The purpose of the Act makes clear property is defined by property and
casualty insurance coverage. Indeed, Congress limited TRIP certification
based on a threshold of aggregate property and casualty insurance
losses.110 And Congress further defined “insured loss” as “losses resulting
from an act of terrorism…that is covered by primary or excess property
and casualty insurance.”111 So the exclusions provide a safeguard for
insurers in the event the Secretary of the Treasury intends to certify a
cyberattack that falls under an exclusion.
Second, insurers are allowed to apply exclusions to claims.
Nothing in TRIA overrides exclusions.112 By only attaching TRIPrequired payments to active property and casualty insurance claims,113
Congress implicitly allowed insurers to forego payments on any types of
terror attacks as long as insurers excluded coverage for that type of claim
under all circumstances. For example, active act of war exclusions still
apply to policies. If a hostile state attacks the United States, insurers would
not pay claims, nor be expected to pay claims, due to act of war
exclusions.114
Although the aforementioned exclusions would also be applied
narrowly to cyber risk insurance policies, such exclusions would likely
hold. Courts tend to construe insurance policies narrowly.115 Under the
doctrine of contra proferentem, any ambiguity in an exclusion is generally
construed against the insurer and in favor of the insured.”116 Contra
proferentem especially applies when insurers know the language in their
109
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policies are ambiguous.117
However, courts only apply contra
proferentem in cases of ambiguous exclusions.118 So, if insurers have
reason to make the language in such exclusions as exact as possible, courts
will not have reason to apply contra proferentem against insurers.
Recently policyholders have won cases in which insurers rejected claims
based on intellectual property exclusions.119 There is a growing body of
caselaw against these standardized exclusions, forcing insurers to more
precisely define their exclusions. So, even if claims are submitted on a
TRIP-certified act of terrorism, the exclusions would likely apply.
The final prong of the first criteria presents a similar issue, as
“infrastructure” is not defined by the statute.120 In fact, “infrastructure” is
not mentioned again in the statute.121 Courts have not defined the term
“infrastructure,” but under the same logic as the second prong, network
infrastructure may be protected under TRIA. Cyber insurance typically
includes network security and privacy liability, which covers “data breach,
malware infection, cyber extortion demand, ransomware, [and] business
email compromise.”122 These are typical of cyberattacks. At the time of
TRIA enactment, Congress was likely considering physical U.S.
infrastructure, such as building, bridges, and electric power grids.
However, by setting the purpose of the Act in terms of property and
casualty insurance, Congress may have given rise to terrorism risk
coverage for any type of network infrastructure, including business
network systems. Therefore, the Secretary may be able to determine a
terrorist hack is dangerous to infrastructure.
Certification of more destructive types of cyberattacks, such as
NotPetya, would be easier to justify.123 NotPetya was designed to, and
did, destroy computers owned by U.S. businesses, hospitals, and
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infrastructure systems.124 Such a virus is inherently dangerous to human
life, property, and infrastructure. However, viruses like NotPetya are
highly sophisticated and require intensive cyber capabilities to develop.125
For example, NotPetya was developed over a period of a seven years.126
Russian hackers created NotPetya from two separately developed pieces
of software – Mimikatz and EternalBlue.127 Mimikatz was created by a
French security researcher to demonstrate a vulnerability in Microsoft’s
operating system.128 EternalBlue was created by the U.S. National
Security Agency, “but leaked in a disastrous breach of the agency’s
ultrasecret files earlier in 2017.”129
Without such fortune, the
cybercriminals would have been unlikely to independently create such a
sophisticated virus.
2. The Necessity of U.S. Damage
The second general criterion that the attack must “have resulted in
damage in the United States.”130 Damage is defined as “harmful effects
on someone or something.”131 Based on the timing of enactment relative
to the September 11 attacks, the framers of TRIA likely considered
physical damage to U.S. lives, property, and infrastructure when
legislating. However, since then, the concept of damage has expanded,
especially in cyberspace. Although cyberattacks may produce physical
damage,132 most damage is not physical.133 Cybercrime costs typically
include “damage and destruction of data, lost productivity, theft of
intellectual property, theft of personal and financial data, embezzlement,
fraud, post-attack disruption to the normal course of business, forensic
investigation, restoration and deletion of hacked data and systems, and
reputational harm.” Some cyberattacks that produce physical damage
could easily fall under the second prong of Treasury’s criteria. An attack
that physically damages computers in the United States,134 or renders them
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completely useless,135 would meet any definition of “damage” imagined
by TRIA framers.
However, most cyberattacks against U.S. systems typically will
not actually result in damage. For example, a hack may result in stolen
data. But no data will be damaged. The data will be copied onto the
hacker’s system, but it would remain in the original system. In fact,
successful hacking includes concealing or destroying evidence that the
hacker is even in the system.136 Hackers will use programs like Hacker
Defender to “alter the kernel and return false information to system calls,
rendering useless most tools” that detect signs of system compromise.137
A hacker may therefore enter a system, steal data, and exit without the host
knowing she was there.
Data breaches are not as geographically identifiable as physical
attacks. When terrorists attacked the United States on September 11,
2001, no one questioned where the attacks occurred. However, data is
stored in servers. Servers may be located in the United States, but data
centers are located all over the world.138 Due to the ease of relaying data
across continents, U.S. data owned by U.S. firms is sometimes stored
abroad.139 For example, Google has nineteen data centers.140 Eight of
these centers are located either in South America, Europe, or Asia.141 In
order to safeguard data, Google “distribute[s] all data…across many
computers in different locations” rather than “storing each user’s data on
a single machine or set of machines.”142 The data is then chunked and
replicated “over multiple systems to avoid a single point of failure.”143
Google intentionally spreads data across its global network of data centers
to lower the risk to any individual customer.
However, this security protocol creates difficulties for TRIPcertification purposes. Hackers who enter a network system in the United
States, may, even unknowingly, steal data that is located in a data center
outside of the United States. Data stolen from servers outside of the
United States would not meet the standard imposed by the second Treasury
criteria. If a hacker stole Google data, and caused $200 million of property
and casualty damage, but some of the data was not located inside the
135
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United States, the $200 million certification threshold would likely not be
met. Even if a NotPetya-like virus was introduced to the Google network,
causing $200 million of physical damage to Google servers, the threshold
would not be met if some of that damage occurred on a server located
outside of the United States.
3. Attribution
Difficulties in attribution in cyberspace may frustrate the third of
Treasury’s general criteria. The third criterion requires the act to “have
been committed by an individual or individuals, as part of an effort to
coerce the civilian population of the United States or influence the policy
or affect the conduct of the United States Government by coercion.”144
This criterion has two parts. First, the attack must be committed by an
individual or individuals. Second, the individual or individuals must have
intended to coerce the U.S. population, influence U.S. policy, or affect
U.S. Government conduct. Typically, if an attack can be attributed to a
terror organization, the intent requirement may be satisfied implicitly.
Terrorism, by definition, is “use of violence and intimidation, especially
for political purposes.”145 Terrorists’ goals are the stated intent
requirement. Therefore, the government simply needs to make a
determination of attribution to satisfy the third criterion.
Attribution is also necessary because of act of war exclusions. If
the attack is an act of war, insurers will not be required to make payments
on claims. Per typical war risk exclusion language, an act of war must be
committed by “any government or sovereign power,…military, naval or
air forces,… or by an agent of any such government, power, authority, or
forces.”146 The attack must be “hostile” or “warlike.”147 For an attack to
fall under an act of war exclusion, a governmental body or association is
a necessary element.
Attribution in cyberspace for purposes of TRIP certification may
prove difficult. Generally, “establishing attribution for cyber operations
is difficult but not impossible.”148 Cyberspace is an open world. Any
actor, from state-sponsored organizations to individuals in a basement,
may commit a cyberattack. As cyberattacks usually soon met with patches
to render the repeated use futile, successful cyberattacks are novel methods
or viruses created for one-time use. This further creates difficulties in
tracking and tracing the attack down to the original source.
But, although attribution is difficult, “[e]very kind of cyber
operation – malicious or not – leaves a trail.”149 But because of the
complexities involved in novel cyberattacks, according to the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”), “[n]o simple technical process or
automated solution for determining responsibility for cyber operations
144
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exists.”150 So the FBI is convinced it will eventually track down the
originator of any cyberattack, but “the painstaking work in many cases
requires weeks or months of analyzing intelligence and forensics to assess
culpability.”151 How many months it may take to attribute an attack is
uncertain, as it depends on the sophistication of the virus and the attackers.
For example, the WannaCry ransomware was introduced onto computer
systems worldwide on May 12, 2017.152 In December of 2017, seven
months later, the United States attributed the attack to hackers backed by
North Korea.153
As part of the 2015 reauthorization of TRIA, Congress requested
Treasury conduct a study to examine and analyze “the establishment of a
reasonable timeline by which the Secretary must make an accurate
determination on whether to certify an act as an act of terrorism.”154
Treasury declined to delineate any kind of timeline after analyzing the
possibilities.155 Treasury suggested “the uncertainty the Secretary may
face when making a responsible assessment of whether an act is an act of
terrorism” requires an unknown amount of time. “An inflexible timeline
for the certification process that would apply uniformly and rigidly to
potentially disparate circumstances is impractical.”156 Treasury was silent
on the possibility of a flexible timeline.
The speed of the certification process matters.157 Uncertainty on
whether insurers will be required to pay claims on an attack creates lags in
rebuilding and stabilizing after an attack. Any delays will be “financially
significant to consumers, insurers, policyholders, and taxpayers.”158 If the
government requires months, as was suggested by the FBI, to attribute an
attack to a terrorist organization, TRIA may fail to provide financial
stability.
Due to act of war exclusions, unless a cyberattack is clearly
committed by terrorists, insurers would likely attempt to deny claim
payments unless absolutely required. Even after the September 11 attacks,
“there was a general concern that some insurers might attempt to deny
converge under existing policies by invoking the war risk exclusion.”159
This is true even though the attack was quickly attributed to al Qaeda. If
an attack like the WannaCry ransomware were to be considered for TRIP
certification, a seven-month window for the Secretary of the Treasury may
150
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cause major financial strife, as insurers may hold payments until
attribution was made. Even after attribution is made, insurers may then
attempt to apply act of war exclusions on claims. This delay is not only
destructive to the financial systems that rely on TRIP but also due to
certification ambiguity.

III. TRIP CERTIFICATION CRITERIA SHOULD EXPLICITLY INCLUDE
CYBERTERRORISM
The unique qualities of cyberspace and cyberattacks create
difficulties in certifying a cyberterrorist attack as an act of terrorism under
TRIA. Congress reauthorized TRIP in 2019 without any changes.
Congress should have considered these difficulties as the probability of
cyberterrorists attacking U.S. targets rises. And Congress should have
amended the definition of an “act of terrorism” so as to cover
cyberterrorism. This amended definition would have reduce regulatory
uncertainty and ensure insured parties can rely on the guarantees of TRIA.

A. Defining “Property” and “Infrastructure”
Congress should have specifically define property to include
intangible property like intellectual property, data and computer software.
If Congress explicitly includes intangible property as subject to TRIA
coverage, the most likely cyberterrorist attacks, hacks, would be covered
under TRIA. In addition, explicit inclusion of intangible property, data,
and software under TRIA would enable the Secretary to apply the
definition of an act of terrorism to more nuanced types of cyberattacks
quickly and efficiently. Such an efficient response would quell the fears
that initiated TRIA in the first place.160 Efficiency in certification
decisions is crucial for insurers and their insured. With an expanded
definition of property, both insurers and insured would be better informed
on their responsibilities in protecting such property and in responding to
an attack.
Infrastructure should also be defined to include network
infrastructure that is both tangible (hardware) and intangible (software)161
for the same reasons Congress should have expanded the definition of
property.

B. Expanding Attacks to Cyberspace
Treasury’s second criterion requires the damage occurred to have
resulted in the United States. The geographic requirement works well for
physical attacks. However, physical components of the networks that
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make up cyberspace are found all over the world.162 Even data about
U.S. citizens is stored all over the world.163
Congress should have amended the definition of an act of
terrorism to reflect this expansion. Currently, the damage caused,
according to TRIA, must occur within the United States, on an air carrier
or vessel, or the premises of a United States mission.164 However, as more
and more attacks are located in cyberspace, TRIA should reflect the shift
in location by clearly including damage that occurs against U.S. property
but generally within cyberspace.

C. Streamlining Attribution
Finally, as certification decisions are complex, such decisions may
require months to finalize. Attribution challenges would only add to this
delay.165 Attribution is, and will always be, a key and difficult process in
cyberattacks because of the ease of anonymity in cyberspace. Congress
should have attempted to expedite attribution by statutorily creating a
process by which the Executive determines attribution of cyberattacks.
Congress may set up a joint task force specifically for the purpose of TRIA
attribution.166 The task force would be required to determine attribution
within a specified time period. At the end of the period, if no attribution
is made, the Secretary, with the advice of the task force, would move or
decline to certify the attack as an act of terrorism.

CONCLUSION
Under TRIA as written, the Secretary seems to have ultimate
power to certify attacks as an act of terrorism. The Secretary’s
certification decision cannot be delegated to anyone else and cannot be
challenged in court.167 The question is not whether the Secretary can
certify a cyberattack as an act of terrorism. The question is whether the
Secretary will do so.
In cyberspace, events happen almost instantaneously, leading to
immediate disastrous effects.168 If the Secretary does not know whether
she should certify the attack as an act of terrorism, insurers and the insured
do not either. Not only does the uncertainty tie the hands of businesspeople
making decisions based upon potential certifications, but the ultimate
162
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losses fall upon the insured. Data hacking is a highly lucrative activity for
cybercriminals,169 and hacking makes up a significant portion of
cybercriminal activity today.170 Without certification, hacks claimed by
terrorists that are not covered by cyber insurance will continue to fall upon
the shoulders of the insured.
Congress reauthorized TRIP in 2019. To ensure consistent,
efficient application of the certification process under TRIA, Congress
should have augmented the Secretary’s power to certify cyberattacks as
acts of terrorism. Simply clarifying the Secretary’s power under TRIA
would have encouraged the Secretary to take steps to mitigate damages
suffered by the insured. Additionally, requesting government agencies to
work together to tackle attribution in cyberspace would further the goal of
efficient use of TRIA. As of 2019, the Secretary has not found a need to
certify any cyberattack as an act of terrorism. However, hacks in the
aggregate are expected to cause $6 trillion in damages by 2021.171 As
cyberattacks become more common, the need for understanding how the
Secretary may use TRIA to respond to the issue rises.
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